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REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
1. The Railroad Advances Two "Special and Important 
Reasons" For Granting Certiorari, 
The Landowners insist that the Railroad has failed to 
state adequate grounds for this Court to accept this action for 
review. Utah R.App.P. 46 states that this Court will grant 
review of a decision of the Court of Appeals only for "special 
and important reasons." Among these is "a decision that has so 
far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of the Supreme 
Court's power of supervision. . . . " Utah R.App.P. 46(c). Judge 
Bench's majority Opinion, contrary to the Landowners' 
contentions, so departs in two respects: (a) the decision 
overrides the trial court's exercise of case management 
discretion by treating exclusion of an expert as a discovery 
ruling governed by a "possible contempt" standard, and (b) 
through misinterpretation and misapplication of this Court's 
holding in Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saint Hospital, 7 
Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d 330 (1957), the decision relieves the 
Landowners of any obligation to proffer excluded evidence by 
presuming Rule 61 materiality from the Railroad's mere objection 
to the introduction of such evidence. These are vital rulings 
impacting trial court docket management as well as the 
evidentiary prerequisites for appellate review. See also Utah 
R.App.P. 46(d). This Court should review the Court of Appeals' 
decision. 
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2. The Court Of Appeals Erroneously Reversed A Case 
Management Decision Based Upon Rules Of Civil 
Procedure Applicable Only To Discovery. 
The, Court of Appeals, the Landowners and the Railroad 
all agree that the trial court's exclusion of Shroder was a case 
management decision. Yet, as the following quotations from the 
majority opinion establish, the Court of Appeals' entire review 
of the exclusion of Shroder rested on application of discovery 
rules, Utah R.Civ.P. 26(f) and 37(b)(2): 
A trial court's power to sanction a party for failure 
to cooperate in discovery comes from rule 37(b)(2) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [Op., p. 6-7.] * * 
* [N]or did the trial court enter any order 
establishing any deadlines for the final disclosure of 
witnesses pursuant to the discretion granted to it 
under rule 26(f). [Op., p. 8.] * * * We hold that 
absent an order creating a judicially imposed deadline, 
a trial court may not sanction a party by excluding its 
witnesses under rule 37(b)(2). [Op., p. 9.] 
These discovery rules are relevant, if at all, only to reference 
three of the sanctions available to the trial court in a case 
management context. See Utah R.Civ.P. 16(d). They do not serve 
to define the scope of the trial court's discretion. 
Missing from the majority's analysis is any 
consideration or even mention of Utah R.Civ.P. 16 or the court's 
inherent powers (under which case management decisions are made) 
and the fuller range of discretion these clearly afford. Rather, 
the majority adopts Ohio precedents imposing a discovery-based 
"possible contempt" standard (Op., pp. 6-7, 9, 10 n.9.), and 
disregards persuasive Tenth Circuit and constitutional 
authorities that recognize the broader and more flexible 
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standards of discretion under Rule 16 and the inherent judicial 
powers for case management decisions. See Pet. for Cert, at 11-
14; Utah Const. Art. 8, §§ 1, 3-4. Application of such standards 
to Judge Christensen's enforcement of his oral directive1 would 
mandate the affirmance of the judgment in favor of the 
Railroad.2 
3. The Landowners' Admission Of Failure To Make Any 
Record Of Shroder's Proposed Testimony Confirms 
That The Majority Opinion Erroneously Shifts The 
Rule 61 Burden To The Railroad. 
The Landowners concede that they made no proffer. 
(Opp. Brief, p. 9.) Thus, when the Court of Appeals majority 
concluded that Shroder's testimony might have changed the result 
at trial, they necessarily did so without the slightest idea of 
what Shroder might have said to the jury. This speculative 
result was based entirely upon the fact that the Railroad made an 
objection, not just to the naming of Shroder, but to the naming 
of seventy-eight new witnesses only two weeks before trial. The 
legal significance attached to that objection, in turn, was 
1
 A written, entered order is not a prerequisite to an 
enforceable case management directive. See Goforth v. Owens, 7 66 
F.2d 1533, 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1985). 
2
 In this regard, contrary to the Landowners' claims, Duqan 
v. Jones. 615 P. 2d 1239 (Utah 1980) is not on point. Unlike Duqan, 
this action involved a jury trial and the passage of only a few 
days between the trial court's oral directive and the deadline set 
for compliance. As it was, the Landowners were allowed to call and 
did call two timely-named, qualified expert witnesses on the issue 
of causation. Nonetheless, by naming seventy-eight new witnesses 
only two weeks before trial, the Landowners deprived the trial 
court of an effective remedy to sanction their disregard for its 
directive except to exclude late-disclosed witnesses including 
Shroder. 
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premised on a severe misreading of this Court's opinion in 
Groves, supra resulting in a misallocation of the burden under 
Utah R.Civ.P. 61 to show substantial error. 
In contrast to this action, the trial court in Groves 
admitted into evidence the doctor's notes in dispute and they 
were before this Court on appeal. The Court's comments in Groves 
were directed not to the admissibility of the evidence excludedf 
but to the use at trial of writings already in evidence, i.e., 
whether counsel could read from and refer to the doctor's notes 
in closing argument. (These notes arguably would have proven the 
negligence of the defendant hospital.) The Court concluded that 
the limitations on use of the notes imposed by the trial court 
were error. While the defendant insisted that any error was 
harmlessf this Court found that counsel's inability to refer to 
or argue the significance of the doctor's notes was prejudicial. 
To bolster its holding, the Court considered whether 
the defendant's specific objection, which had resulted in the 
ruling preventing use of the notes in closing, was consistent 
with the belated cry of harmless error. The Court's comment on 
this inconsistency, by no means the determinative basis for the 
Court's holding, is the language that the majority opinion finds 
pertinent to the facts of this case. However, the objecting 
party in Groves was not required to answer for its objection in 
the absence of a proffer (as is the case here); rather, with full 
knowledge of the substance of the evidence in question, the 
Groves court resolved a close question under Utah R.Civ.P. 61 
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against the party that had strenuously resisted a specific and 
proper use of competent evidence• 
This result is hardly authority for relieving a party 
of its obligation to place before the Court by way of proffer 
evidence which is the subject matter of an appeal.3 In fact, 
Groves more correctly stands for the proposition that the Court 
must have the evidence at issue before it in order to evaluate 
the materiality of any purported error. Only where review of the 
substance of the evidence is possible and the nature of a 
limitation imposed by the trial court leaves unresolved the issue 
of materiality may the appellate court attach legal significance 
to the objections of the resisting party. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court should grant the 
Railroad's Petition for Writ of Certiorari and review the Court 
of Appeals' decision. 
3
 Dugan is no more helpful to the Landowners on this point 
than it is on abuse of discretion. The exclusion of the 
defendants' appraisal experts by the Dugan trial court "precluded 
them from proving their case." 615 P.2d at 1244. There was no 
need to inquire into the substance of what was to be said by these 
witnesses to know if the trial result might have been different. 
There could be no doubt that the inability to prove the damage 
element through valuation evidence would preclude the plaintiff 
from proving all of the elements of its case in chief. 
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